

THE ARMS PROCUREMENT COMMISSION

STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL G MALINGA

I,

MAJOR GENERAL GERALD MALINGA

Hereby say that:

1. I am currently Deputy Chief of the South African Air Force (SAAF).
2. A copy of my curriculum vitae is attached marked "GM-1".
3. The contents of this statement are, unless the context indicates otherwise, within my knowledge and they are to the best of my knowledge and belief true and correct.
4. I have been asked to provide a statement relating to matters that may be relevant to the rationale for the Strategic Defence Procurement Packages (the SDPP).
5. Since I was not directly involved in the setting up of the SDPPs I have no personal knowledge of the relevant facts and I am not in a position to describe the process and or the rationale for the SDPPs. Accordingly, to the extent that I comment on these I do so on the basis of information that I have received.

THE SANDF'S MANDATE

6. Section 200(2) of the Constitution provides that it is the primary objective of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force. This is deemed to be mandate of the SANDF.
7. The terms "defend and protect" do not only entail engagement in combat operations, but also include Military Operations Other Than War, including peace support missions, and any other tasks as may be ordered by Government and as provided for in law. This highlights the Department of Defence's (DOD) and in particular the SANDF's responsibility to support other Government Departments

and the people of the country in terms of protection against environmental and non-military threats.

8. Defence strategic objectives are the primary drivers for the development of defence capabilities. These objectives must, however, be pursued within the context of the future defence environment and South Africa's approach to security, including collective and human security.

DEFENCE FUNCTIONS

9. According to Section 227(1) of the 1993 Interim Constitution the functions of the SANDF are:
 - 9.1 service in the defence of the Republic, for the protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity;
 - 9.2 service in compliance with international obligations of the Republic with regard to international bodies and other states;
 - 9.3 service in the preservation of life, health or property;
 - 9.4 service in the provision or maintenance of essential services;
 - 9.5 service in upholding law and order in support of the SAPS; and
 - 9.6 service in support to departments of state for socio-economic upliftment.
10. Schedule 6 Annexure D Section 4 of the Constitution, 1996, requires that the SANDF shall exercise its powers and perform its function solely in the national interest in terms of Chapter 11 of the Constitution.
11. South Africa also has international commitments, particularly in the African region, to support operations under the auspices of the United Nations and other organisations such as OAU/AU & SADC, which involve military resources. The SANDF has the additional task of protecting the coastline and the marine resources of the Republic.

HISTORY

12. Before dealing with the SDPP process and what led up to it I consider it appropriate to set out some of the background that is relevant as far as the SAAF is concerned.
13. The SAAF is the second oldest independent Air Force in the world after the Royal Air Force of Great Britain. From its birth in 1920, the SAAF had a fighter/bomber capability, which was an Imperial gift with bi-planes and during World War Two (WW2) the SAAF fighter and bomber aircrews and ground crews participated as part of the allied forces and did the country proud. The propeller driven monoplane aircraft (Hurricanes, Spitfires and Lancasters) flown in WW2 were a lot larger and of a much higher performance category than the pre-second world war biplanes.
14. In the early fifties the SAAF was again called upon to serve, this time in the Korean War. This was the advent of SAAF crews flying and maintaining jet aircraft, namely the Sabres of the United States Air Force. At this stage the SAAF was using 333 American Harvards for its basic training. Soon thereafter the SAAF acquired 77 Vampire jet trainer and fighter aircraft from the United Kingdom to train jet crews and create a jet fighter capability.
15. Later in the fifties the SAAF acquired 34 transonic Sabre aircraft from Canada as its fighter aircraft. Thus the three tier fighter training system was established. This meant that training took place in three tiers, with trainee pilots commencing on the Harvard for basic flying training and then graduating to the Vampire for fighter jet training and then to the Sabre, which was the operational aircraft. At this stage the SAAF had 111 jet trainer and fighter aircraft.
16. As airpower evolved after WW2, Korea and the war in Vietnam it became evident that there were three key tenets of airpower, namely flexibility, mobility and firepower, which could be mustered, utilised and delivered rapidly, with surprise and over long distances.
17. Since this period, air forces have become an integral part of most balanced defence forces worldwide, participating jointly with armies, navies and special forces all supported by defence industries and research centres.
18. In the sixties and early seventies the SAAF acquired the first jet bomber and reconnaissance aircraft, namely 9 Canberras and 16 Buccaneers from the United Kingdom, and in parallel the SAAF entered the supersonic fighter era by acquiring 57 MIR III variants from Dassault in France. During these times sanctions began to be increasingly imposed against the Republic making it more and more difficult to acquire arms. The Armaments Corporation (Arm Scor) began to play a key role in

arms acquisition for the Republic and together with local Industry became increasingly independent in supplying arms to the then SADF. The government of the day saw that conflict and threats were building up and, therefore, the defence budget grew over the years to fund, develop and sustain a formidable SADF of which the SAAF was part.

19. From the mid-sixties to early seventies the 77 Vampires were phased out and Atlas Aircraft Corporation (now Denel Aviation) built 151 Impala Mk I jet trainers and 100 Impala Mk II light fighter aircraft under licence from Aermacchi in Italy. In the mid-seventies, in order to increase its strategic reach and stay abreast with the latest technology, the SAAF acquired two variants of Mirage F1 fighters from Dassault in France, namely 16 Air to Air F1CZ and 32 F1AZ Air to Ground aircraft. These aircraft had an in-flight refuelling (IFR) capability, increased payload, more modern cockpits and weapons capabilities. In this era dedicated variants of types were required for different roles. The SAAF retained a three tier fighter training system throughout, and at this time it was Harvard to Impala and then on to the various operational types. Just prior to phasing out the 34 Sabre aircraft in 1980 the SAAF had around total of 350 jet trainer, fighter, bomber and reconnaissance aircraft acquired from numerous manufacturers in different western countries.
20. The 'Bush War' was in its build up phase and sanctions continued to bite. As the threat built up so did the defence budget, which peaked at around 4% of GDP by the late eighties.
21. By the early eighties many aircraft manufacturers were developing fly by wire controlled airframes with electronically controlled engines, digital cockpits with integrated avionics including sophisticated Electronic Warfare Suites (EWS) and precision weapons delivery capabilities. Examples are the F-16, Mig-29 and Mirage 2000. The Israeli Aircraft Industry (IAI) had also started to upgrade the Israeli Air Force fighters with advanced airframe features and a digital cockpit.
22. In order to keep up with these advances in the airpower domain, the SAAF, Armscor and local Industry embarked on a programme with IAI to upgrade the MIR III aircraft to these standards and to enable the SAAF to enter the digital era of fighter aircraft operations. The result of this effort was the Cheetah aircraft. Three variants of Cheetah aircraft were delivered to the SAAF between 1986 and 1994 and with these also 5 Boeing 707 aircraft for the EWS, IFR, Passenger/Freight roles. During the late eighties the 'Bush War' came to an end, peace talks ensued in the then South West Africa and back in the RSA talks began towards a political solution. The Defence budget was drastically cut in the early nineties and many squadrons closed and a lot of

aircraft were phased out. These included the Canberra, Buccaneer, Mir F1CZ and some Impala/Cheetah aircraft.

23. Post the 1994 democratic elections, further defence budget cuts reduced the SAAF fighter fleet even further when the Mir F1AZ and more Impalas were phased out. By now the Impala fleet of aircraft was beginning to age fast and the remaining Cheetah fleet was estimated to have a life till 2012.
24. With regard to helicopters, following their introduction into the battle zone during the latter stages of World War II and then being refined for utilisation in medical evacuation, observation and re-supplying of friendly forces during the Korean conflict, the versatility and the capability of the helicopter as a “force multiplier” was realised.
25. In 1957 the SA Air Force formed its first helicopter squadron, i.e. 17 Squadron, with one Sikorsky S-51 and three Sikorsky S-55s. The SA Air Force started the 1960s with almost no helicopters, only the three S-55s and one S-51. These helicopters, based on the helicopter evolution during and from the Korean War, were purchased primarily to fight and eradicate the Tsetse Fly in the northern parts of South Africa.
26. The first modern turbine engine helicopters procured by the SAAF from France, were a small number of Alouette II's delivered in 1961. These helicopters were primarily used for training. From 1962 the SAAF started taking delivery of Alouette III's, which became the standard light utility helicopter. The Alouette III's had been acquired largely for scouting and liaison, but also on the basis of the extensive use of light helicopters in Korea for casualty and medical evacuation, which had been noted by SAAF pilots who were deployed there with 2 Squadron SA Air Force as part of the allied forces. Further batches of Alouette III's followed in 1967 and 1975, by which time the SAAF had gained operational experience working with the Rhodesian forces, using the Alouette III in reconnaissance, command and trooping roles, as well as in the close air support role with machine-guns and a 20 mm cannon. Meanwhile the SAAF had also bought the Wasp from the United Kingdom as its ship borne helicopter used for anti-submarine operations and the Super Frelon, also from France, as its heavy lift helicopter, ordering 16 of latter as the first export customer for the type. The Frelons were delivered between June 1967 and November 1969, the same year in which the SAAF ordered its first Pumas for the medium transport helicopter role. The Alouette II was phased out in 1974 and the Alouette III then became the primary basic helicopter trainer.
27. Following the escalation of the “Bush War”, one requirement that grew out of these considerations was the ability to swiftly deploy, redeploy and support troops over

difficult terrain in the absence of roads. The clear answer there was a transport helicopter.

28. After analysing the Puma and carrying out some test flights, the SAAF selected the Puma as the preferred Medium Transport Helicopter for the SAAF. Deliveries commenced in November 1969 with different variants being delivered. The Puma generally proved a very useful and effective aircraft, but some shortcomings became evident quite early in its service with the SAAF.
29. Operational experience with the Alouette III, Puma and Super Frelon in the various 'Operational Areas' of northern Southern Africa in the 1970s and early 1980s resulted in various replacement options being undertaken by SAAF Senior Management. Two helicopter requirements; for a tactical medium transport helicopter, optimised for long-range operations in a 'hot and high' environment, and for a 'combat support helicopter' to escort troop helicopters and provide close air support during air assault operations, to provide close air support for paratroops once on the Drop Zone, and to provide a mobile anti-armour force.
30. The Puma shortcomings were key elements to be addressed during the Puma replacement project. This Puma replacement project resulted in the locally developed Oryx Medium Transport Helicopter for the SAAF where engines, main and tail rotor blades, main, intermediate and tail gear boxes, amongst were industrialised that could be used by the developing Rooivalk Combat Support helicopter and an upgrade for the Super Frelon. The first flight of the Oryx was in 1987. The Super Frelon was however phased out in 1989 and the Alouette III replacement project was initiated in 1992.
31. In 1990, when the South African Air Force (SAAF) received its first major "budget cut", the helicopter fraternity realised that it had to review its helicopter fleet composition. The Medium Transport Helicopter (MTH) fleet was already being upgraded with the introduction of the new Oryx MTH, however the future of the Alouette III needed to be reviewed.
32. The Alouette III had been in service since 1962 and was becoming more difficult to operate, as costs were increasing and the helicopter was limited in its operational utilisation i.e. was a single engine helicopter, having its inherent limitations at night and poor visibility limitations. Indications were that Eurocopter, France, were to soon discontinue the spares production line.

POLICY DOCUMENTS

33. Following the 1994 democratic elections, and during May 1996 the former Minister of Defence, Mr J Modise, presented the White Paper on National Defence for the Republic to Parliament (the White Paper). It received strong support from all the political parties and was approved by Parliament. A policy framework and the main principles of defence were thereby established.
34. The White Paper also made provision for a Defence Review to include the following:
 - 34.1 options with regard to the size, roles and the structure of the SANDF;
 - 34.2 addressing the implications of the core force approach for the size, doctrine, structure, weaponry, equipment and other features of the SANDF;
 - 34.3 addressing the strategic and technical implications of the constitutional provision that the SANDF "*shall be primarily defensive in the exercise of its powers and functions.*"
35. The aim of the proposed Defence Review of 1998 was to elaborate on the policy framework based on the long-term planning of issues such as structure, force design, force levels and armaments.
36. By this time further defence budget cuts reduced the SAAF fighter fleet even further when the Mir F1AZ and more Impalas were phased out. By now the Impala fleet of aircraft was beginning to age fast and the remaining Cheetah fleet was estimated to have a life till 2012.
37. The Minister of Defence at the time appointed a working group to draft the Defence Review with the Secretary of Defence as coordinator. The working group presented several briefings to the parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence. For the periods September 1994 to January 1999 to 1 June 1999, the committee was chaired by Mr T Y Yengeni and Ms T R Modise, respectively.
38. As I understand that the 1996 White Paper and the 1998 Defence Review are likely to be referred to frequently throughout the Commission's hearings I do not attach copies to this statement as I am advised that this would result in unnecessary duplication.

DEFENCE REVIEW

39. The Defence Review is the policy from which the Force Design is developed.
40. The Force Design is the deployable component supported by the Force Structure and the Personal Establishment Table. In determining the Force Design with the said supporting structure of the SANDF for the 21st century, the following had to be established by the Defence Review:
 - 40.1 the tasks that the SANDF will and may have to perform in the future;
 - 40.2 the manner in which these tasks should be undertaken;
 - 40.3 the equipment and weaponry required by the SANDF to fulfil these tasks;
 - 40.4 the policy contained in the White Paper on Defence;
 - 40.5 an analysis of the internal and external security environment.

The process during which the Defence Review developed the Force Design was based on the assumption that the ‘...so called ‘tooth-to-tail’ ratio’ of the SANDF will be corrected by the transformation process, thus realising a greater portion of the budget for combat capabilities.’ This assumption proved to be incorrect due to, among other things, continued financial reductions and increased military deployment in support of internationally mandated Peace Missions.

DEFENCE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

41. The requirement for the SANDF to defend and protect South Africa and to support broader government initiatives translates into the following three Defence Strategic Objectives, consistent with the priorities of Government and the Medium Term Strategic Framework (MTSF);
 - 41.1 to defend and protect South Africa, its sovereignty, its territorial integrity, its national interests and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force;
 - 41.2 to contribute to freedom from fear and want, including the promotion of human security, both nationally and internationally;
 - 41.3 to contribute to a better life for the people of South Africa.

42. When relating the objectives to Military Strategic Objectives they are expressed as follows:

42.1 enhancing and maintaining of comprehensive defence capabilities;

42.2 promoting peace, stability and security in the region and the continent;

42.3 supporting the people of South Africa.

FORCE DESIGN

43. The Defence Review indicated that defence planning can be described as “needs driven and cost constrained”. The Department of Defence developed different force design options. These options reflected the different permutations of the level of defence, defence structure and cost, for public consideration during the consultative conferences on the Defence Review. Cabinet and the Parliamentary Defence Committees were presented with four options, which were discussed in detail. The chosen option relevant to this investigation is set out below and was approved, subject to the availability of finances.

44. The quality of defence is enhanced through a force design and structure, comprising balanced capabilities that act as a deterrent to any would-be aggressor and such a force structure establishes the basis for multinational operations, cooperation and exercises. The balanced and flexible force structure provides a portfolio of inherent capabilities by which all defence missions can be prioritised and conducted.

45. Chapter 8 of the Defence Review set out the Force Design Options. In so far as the SAAF was concerned the recommended option, which appears at the end of Chapter 8, was as follows:

Fighters	
Light Fighters	16
Medium Fighters	32
Reconnaissance	
Light Reconnaissance Aircraft	16
Medium Sigint Aircraft	0
Long Range Maritime Patrol Aircraft	6

Medium Range Maritime Patrol Aircraft	0
Short Range Maritime Patrol Aircraft	10
Remotely Piloted Squadrons	1.0
Helicopters	
Combat Support Helicopters	12
Maritime Helicopters	5
Transport Helicopters	96
Transport Aircraft	
Transport Aircraft	44
VIP	9
Voluntary Squadrons	9
In Flight Refuelling/Electronic	5
Warfare A/C	
Airspace Control	
Radar Squadrons	3.5
Point Defence Squadrons	-
Mobile Ground Sigint Team	3
TOTAL COST (Rm)	R1 725

THREATS

46. The absence of a clearly defined military threat does not mean that the SANDF had no requirements of rejuvenation. The mandate and subsequent discussions above clearly indicate that the SANDF should have a Force Design to be able to execute its mandate. Threats usually appear unexpectedly and do not always allow for long lead times to acquire combat systems which include the equipment and competent operators.

RATIONALE FOR THE SDPPs

47. During the selection process, certain foreign countries approached the DOD, formally and informally, with various offers to enter into agreements to procure military equipment. These offers entailed packages consisting of Naval, Air Force and Army **equipment. This resulted** in the Department of Defence adopting a “package” approach to the acquisition process as opposed to the individual purchasing of equipment types. These offers became known as the Strategic Defence Procurement Packages (SDPPs). The SDPP’s were not funded from the Defence Vote but through a special dispensation by the National Treasury.

48. As is clear from the history I have set out above the SAAF combat capability was developed over decades into a formidable airpower capability for the Republic, which was well equipped and remained technologically abreast with worldwide developments. Continuous acquisition was a key element throughout this process and even in the sanctions era this trend continued through Armscor and local Industry innovations, adaptations and capabilities.
49. The SAAF retained a three tier combat training system throughout its history and also gained experience and built close ties with numerous air forces, allowing it to benchmark and remain a respected force worldwide. The SAAF was an early entrant into the digital era of aircraft albeit first through an upgrade programme but valuable lessons were learnt during this period by all stakeholders leading up to the Strategic Defence Packages in the late nineties to replace the rapidly ageing Impala Trainer and Light Fighter as well as the Cheetah/Mirage F1AZ medium fighter fleets.
50. The need and debate for replacement of the above fleets commenced in the early nineties and the SAAF rationale in 1996 was to replace the Impala fleet, which had become obsolete, with 48 Advanced Fighter Trainer (AFT) as soon as possible and to replace the Cheetah fleet with a Future Medium Fighter (FMF) by around 2008 to be operational by 2012. Cognisance was taken of the replacement programme of the Harvard basic trainer fleet with the Pilatus ASTRA.
51. The new Constitution, the White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review of 1998 mandated the need for a SAAF Air Defence capability that included 2 frontline Squadrons of 32 FMF's and a light fighter Squadron and a Combat Flying School of 48 AFTs. The 1997 budget cuts dealt a blow to this strategy as the funds available to the SAAF at that time were inadequate to pursue the strategy.
52. The Defence Budget at this stage was at a much lower percentage of GDP. The SAAF was forced to review the strategy due to cost, and not due to operational requirements. The result was a lowering of the requirement from a FMF to an Advanced Light Fighter (ALFA) which would also have to carry out the roles of the envisaged AFT aircraft. The numbers were reduced from 48 to 38. This in effect changed the strategy from a three tier to a two tier training approach. By this time the package approach to replacing ageing SANDF main equipment was underway and the ALFA was included in the then SDPPs.
53. It is my understanding that once the ALFA Request for Information (RFI) was received back a short list of three contenders were selected for the Request for Offer (RFO) phase and at the same time it transpired that the SAAF would still require a Lead In

Fighter Trainer (LIFT) and return to a three tier approach. This was presented by the then Chief of the Air Force to the Armaments Acquisition Council (AAC).

54. The project processes were carried out for the ALFA and, as a result of that process, the Gripen was selected by Government in November 1998 as the preferred bidder to satisfy the ALFA requirement. After a year of contract negotiations the Project UKHOZI Gripen contracts were signed in December 1999.
55. As explained above the decision to maintain to the three tier approach in November 1997 was the start of Project WINCHESTER to deliver 24 LIFT aircraft to the SAAF and as part of the SDPPs.
56. The project processes were followed for the LIFT and the Hawk was selected by Government in November 1998 as the preferred bidder to satisfy the LIFT requirement. After a year of contract negotiations the Project WINCHESTER Hawk Contracts were signed in December 1999.

HELICOPTERS

57. A study was launched in 1992, where all stake holders were consulted on their requirements for the Alouette III replacement. This study indicated that at least 60 units were required to replace the Alouette III fleet.

CONCLUSION

58. The SANDF is obliged to deliver on its mandate and execute other tasks as ordered by Government. To do this efficiently and effectively the SANDF requires the necessary equipment. The equipment that is required was approved by Parliament. Some of the equipment was acquired through the SDPPs.

Signed at Pretoria on August 2013

G. MALINGA