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CHAIRPERSON: Maybe before we start can we just ask the witness to confirm that he is still under oath?

MAJ GEN MALINGA: I do.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

5 MS RAMAGAGA: Thank you Chair, we are ready to proceed. Right General Malinga, when we adjourned you were still busy with paragraph 16 which appears on page 3 of your statement, you had informed the Commission about the three tenants of power and what I would like you now to do is to illustrate by
10 way of example as to what is meant and how do you show that you have the flexibility, the mobility and the firepower, each of those concepts by way of examples.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry, which page are we referring to?

MS RAMAGAGA: We are on page 3 paragraph 16 of the
15 statement, bundle G. Have you found the ... Right, thank you. You can proceed then General Malinga.

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Thank you Mr Chair. Mr Chair, on Wednesday I did mention the fact that there are three core characteristics of airpower and those are speed, reach and
20 height and out of those over the years it was realised that there are certain specific truths that you can attribute to airpower, those truths or tenants are that airpower is flexible, very mobile and has the ability to concentrate firepower. Flexibility as the word suggests can be looked at in as far
25 airpower is concerned first from the point of departure by

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saying aircraft on their own are very flexible, there's no obstacle next to them when they are up in the air, unless there are other aircraft, so the ability to turn quickly, ability to, they are agile but more importantly the flexibility we are talking
5 about is the ability to change from one assigned task or having completed one assigned task, be able to conduct another, or other tasks without coming back to land, be reconfigured and-and.

In the olden days that was true. Flexibility,
10 because when you are on an assigned task or a specific object and you are coming back either back to base or to do something else on the way there could be fleeting opportunities where you see or you detect and identify a target or a couple of targets that will add in the friendly forces achieving a certain
15 objective.

Importantly so these days with the advance in technology there are now capabilities of weaponry that can be fired or employed beyond visual range, you detect an object, identify it, or a target and you fire, you can fire 80 kilometres
20 away. These munitions are called "fire and forget", you fire, you know you are going to hit that target and then you do something else, that's the flexibility I'm talking about.

In terms of mobility that too is an attribute that the Air Force, unlike the other services, the Army or the Navy,
25 which are on the surface, the Air Force is able to get to a

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specific point fast before the enemy could react and from that point even go to another point within a very short space of time, but more importantly there are no mountains or rivers to cross or sea storms and things like those, so mobility is a key, key tenant, it's a truth that cannot be questioned.

I will make an example, but I'll start by this, my colleagues earlier on spoke of the fact that 70% of the air surface is covered by water, I want to say that 100% of the air surface is covered by air and because of that we go over the highest mountain or the highest obstacles in the world, we can go to a target in a short space of time, be there at the right time and deliver decisive firepower.

Speaking of firepower Mr Chair I did mention briefly on Wednesday a few years back it would have taken several aircraft probably to take out a major bridge, that bridge could have been an operational target but more often than not it would be a strategic target. For instance in the Vietnam War it would be a wave after wave of bomber aircraft targeting a bridge like that, today because of the technology, and the Gripen is capable of that with the right munitions on board, two missiles at most can take out that bridge and that Gripen could swing-role immediately after hitting that bridge decisively and go do something else, reconnaissance or air-to-air combat in support of the surface forces.

There are many examples Ma'am that one can talk

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about, the important, for me, because there's an argument around that, is Operation Allied Force in Serbia, during the Balkan wars, particularly in Kosovo, for the first time in history air forces or airpower played the major role in coercing a state
5 into doing what the allied nations wanted it to do. Serbia succumbed to airpower largely.

Military theorists or even serving members in many, many militaries around the world still argue about that to say can we use an air force autonomously without any support from
10 the Army or the Navy. Some of us are saying it is possible depending on the nature of that conflict, depending on many other factors, terrain could be an issue, some places are in remote, remote, remote areas of the earth where an army will take a long while to reach or a navy with what they have cannot
15 actually, unless you know you are the US Navy and all of that, you've got intercontinental missiles onboard your ships but generally for everybody else to each remote areas only an air force can do that.

MS RAMAGAGA: Shall we then proceed to the next
20 paragraph, paragraph 17. You are making reference to the balanced forces, can you tell the Commission as to what constitutes the balanced force and what are the benefits of a balanced force in planning operations?

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Mr Chair, the concept of balanced
25 defence force is another that started around or just about the

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end of the Vietnam War when airpower was now recognised to be a very, very effective dimension of war, so many commanders started to, when they do planning for operations, put together the capabilities available to a defence force, combination of capabilities at sea, capabilities on land with airpower, so when the planning operations started with ... You know, it wasn't now purely an army campaign and then the army asking the navy to do some shelling from the coastline or the air force to ..., but from the onset when they start planning their approach was to balance the capabilities that are available or are at the disposal to the commander or the commanders.

MS RAMAGAGA: Right, then in the next paragraph, paragraph 18 you are talking about the period 1960's and early 1970's within the Air Force, you mentioned that there were further acquisitions and also there was also an evolution relating to the technology in relation to armaments. Can you please take us through that?

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Thank you Mr Chair. What we are trying to point out here is that the South African Air Force acquired the first dedicated jet bombers and reconnaissance aircraft.

MS RAMAGAGA: Just before you proceed General can you please explain as to what do you mean by a reconnaissance?

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Reconnaissance Ma'am is that art or it's a specific task where you want to see what's happening, take

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pictures of something or confirm what has been detected or you want to see what the opposing force has put in place, or you could be actually photographing a target, a potential target like I've been referring to bridges and things. Basically it's the ability to see what's on the other side in basic terms.

MS RAMAGAGA: Then you may proceed.

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Mr Chair, these acquisitions were Canberra aircraft and Buccaneers, nine and 16 respectively, these also were acquired from the United Kingdom but at the same time the South African Air Force acquired supersonic aircraft for the first time, these were 57 Mirage III aircraft that were referred to in the slideshow that was shown on Wednesday morning.

MS RAMAGAGA: Will you please explain as to what do you mean by a supersonic fighter?

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Mr Chair, a supersonic aircraft is that aircraft that can fly faster than the speed of sound. On Wednesday morning when the slideshow was on my colleague tried to show you the Mirage III and he tried to explain in terms of transonic and supersonic. I will repeat that explanation. There are three levels in terms of aircraft ability in relation to the speed of sound and the measure that is used is called a Mach number. Any aircraft that flies lower than 0.85 Mach is flying subsonic. Any aircraft that flies between 0.85 and 1.2 roughly is termed a transonic aircraft. Any aircraft that can fly

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faster than 1.2 in level flight, not in a dive is a supersonic aircraft.

MS RAMAGAGA: Thank you General. You may proceed then to deal with the evolution in relation to the 1960's and early
5 1970's.

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Mr Chair after the acquisition of the Mirage III aircraft, or I must say this, these Mirage III's were in different configuration, there were three variants of them because those days you had to have dedicated aircraft,
10 dedicated for reconnaissance which we just spoke about and air-to-ground attack aircraft and air-to-air combat aircraft. From then on this country began to be really, really cornered from all over via sanctions and the Armaments Corporation or what we now call ARMSCOR in short form began to play a key
15 role in arms acquisition for this country and together with local industry became increasingly independent in supplying arms to the SANDF or the SADF at that time.

Because this country at that time saw conflict and threats from all around and therefore the defence budget grew
20 and over the years it further grew in order to fund, develop and sustain a formidable fighting machine and the South African Air Force was part of this.

MS RAMAGAGA: Right, in page 4 of your statement, the next paragraph that I'd like you to deal with is paragraph 19
25 which deals with the era mid-1960's to early 1970's which deals

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with the phasing out of the Vampire, the three-tier system and as well as the introduction of the Impala Mk2, you may proceed to tell the Commission about that era.

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Mr Chair, the Commission will recall that
5 on Wednesday we had mentioned that this country had acquired
Vampires and Sabre's and with that introduced the three-tier
training system for fighter pilots. At this point in time where
paragraph 19 is concerned those Vampires had come to the end
of their useful life and these were replaced by the Impala Mk2
10 and Mk1. Impala Mk1 was the trainer for fighter pilots and
Impala Mk2 was a light attack aircraft.

These were built under license from Aermacchi in Italy, they were built by the Atlas Corporation in South Africa, a 151 of them were built in total. In the mid-1970's in order for
15 the country to reach or to have strategic reach and stay
abreast with the latest technology it was deemed fit that the
South African Air Force acquire two variants of the Mirage F1.
These were acquired from France, a company called Dasol,
there were 16 air-to-air variants of this and 32 air-to-ground
20 variants of this aircraft, so all in all there were 48 Mirage F1's
that were acquired.

These aircraft also had a capability that we call in-flight refueling or air-to-air refueling. Remember I just said strategic reach, so these could fly to a point where they
25 needed refueling, then another aircraft which was used as a

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tanker or is used as a tanker will come in and then they just slot behind it and refuel from that aircraft in the air.

The South African then returned a three-tier training system Ma'am and it was the Harvard to Impala then, at that point the Harvard at Central Flying School, after
5 qualifying, getting your wings for your basic flying then you go to the Impala Mk1 if you were streamed as a fighter pilot. From the Impala Mk1 then to the operational aircraft, in this case all the variants that, or all the types that we've
10 mentioned, the Mirage III, Mirage F1 and the Impala Mk2.

Also in this period Ma'am the Sabre's were decommissioned, they had reached the end of their useful life also, but at this point in time this Air Force had 355 fighter and bomber aircraft, 355, this is the mid-1980's towards the late
15 1980's. Today all in all we have only 52 fighter aircraft, that is about 15% of what this Air Force was in the 1980's.

MS RAMAGAGA: General, thank you. Are you able to comment as to why it is that we currently have 52 fighter aircraft whereas way back in or around the 1980's the South
20 African Air Force was sitting with about 355 jet trainer fighter and bomber aircraft?

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Mr Chair, probably I should say to me there are two or three main reasons, I'm saying two or three because I think two of them are linked, but the first one is this
25 country was no longer at war, it was a democratic country now

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promoting good relations with everybody, the Cold War was over, the world was no longer polarised and by the way with this it was not unique to South Africa, many, many countries around the world had to scale down their level of defence ambition. But there are two other factors in my mind, one is that technology has played a key role, we mentioned three variants of the Mirage III aircraft, we no longer need three variants, so there's no longer a need to buy a big, or to acquire a big fleet because the capability we have now is multirole or swing-role depending on how you look at it. One platform can do all reconnaissance, air-to-ground, air-to-air.

But lastly, and linked to the technology you spend less money in buying modern technology, you buy less platforms but in 1990 the first biggest defence cut in terms of budget happened, so there was no longer that big purse available to the Defence Force as it was before 1990. Secondly in 1997 just when these SDPP's were being looked at there was another huge budget cut, so the choice of technology rather than numbers was also influenced by the budget, so these two are linked in my mind.

MS RAMAGAGA: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry, just for my own understanding General, I think in your statement you say that in the 1980's you had about, the Air Force had about 350 jet trainer fighter bomber and reconnaissance aircraft and you say they were

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acquired from various manufacturers and now you say today we have only 52 fighter aircraft. Now my question is at the time out of the 350 aircraft that were referred to, how many of them were fighter aircraft?

5 MAJ GEN MALINGA: Thank you Mr Chair. All, all of that 355 were fighter aircraft in terms of categorisation, so they all fell under the, nowadays I will say Director Combat Systems, meaning whether it was a bomber aircraft or a reconnaissance aircraft in as far as being either a Mirage III or a Canberra or a
10 Buccaneer, they were all in the category of fighter aircraft. These 355 I'm referring to doesn't include transport and maritime aircraft, it doesn't include helicopters.

MS RAMAGAGA: Right General, will you then, you have made mention of the fact that there were serious budget cuts
15 over a period commencing from 1990, can you just give us, give the Commission an indication of the extent of the budget that was committed to the Defence Force at the time and also indicate as to presently what is the percentage that is dedicated to the Defence Force.

20 MAJ GEN MALINGA: Thank you Mr Chair. By the mid-1980's the defence budget was 4.7% of GDP, almost 5%, if you look at it in terms of total government expenditure it was 25.7% of total government expenditure. Today the defence budget is about 1.2% of GDP and about 16% of total government
25 expenditure. I speak under correction but that's particularly

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today's figures, I know it's there, about 1.2% of GDP Ma'am.

MS RAMAGAGA: Right, thank you. Shall we then proceed to paragraph 21 where you are talking about the further technology development, we've seen the armament industry and
5 also proceed to paragraph 22 which deals with how the South African Defence Force responded to this advancing technology in terms of acquisition.

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Thank you Mr Chair. We are talking now about the 1980's and worldwide what was happening is a new
10 generation of fighter aircraft was being either researched or being developed. These aircraft were mainly flight-by-wire, what we call flight-by-wire, meaning there's a central computer onboard. When a pilot puts in an input, whether turning or climbing up or descending the computer deals with the, what we
15 call the flight surfaces on the wings and the tail and things like those, of the aircraft.

But more importantly the cockpits were going digital also from analogue, meaning you could now integrate flight information with other information that's coming in, whether it's
20 a weather radar, what you detect on the weather radar, what you get with your cameras and whatever, sensors are onboard, all that information could be integrated to form a picture for the pilot or the crew. These were termed fourth generation fighter aircraft.

25 Examples of these would be the MIG29, the Mirage

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2000. MIG29 is the Russian fighter, a Mirage 2000 is a light fighter made by Dassault again in France, the F16 of the Americans, some were at different stages of development and some, the initial thrust would be altered by new things in
5 technology but ultimately whatever came out is, was a new generation of fighters.

Now with countries like Israel, also the, particularly the Israeli aircraft industry had also started to upgrade its own aircraft into the digital era and to incorporate electronic
10 warfare suits that were far more advanced. South Africa took that opportunity because there was pressure also to not be left behind technologically, that's when now the Mirage III aircraft was worked on with these new digital electronic suits into what now we call the Cheetah. So the Cheetah was a modernised
15 Mirage III. Mr Chair I don't know if I've answered the question properly.

MS RAMAGAGA: Right, from the evidence it would appear that the Cheetahs were only phased in late in the 1980's and deliveries were also done even in the early 1990's. Now can
20 you, will you please inform the Commission about the question as to whether the Cheetahs did get sufficient time to participate in the operations or whether they did participate in the operations at all.

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Thank you Mr Chair. Yes it's true, I think
25 the last delivery of the Cheetah was in 1994 and to answer the

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question specifically they never participated in operations. And also I want to clarify this fact, the Cheetah was not a brand new aircraft by the way, it was the Mirage III upgraded to a digital cockpit and a few other tweaks of the airframe.

5 MS RAMAGAGA: Was the upgrade done in South Africa, is it the South Africans that acquired the license to upgrade the Mirage or what is the position?

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Mr Chair, this was a joint venture between South Africa and Israel but yes, Denel Aviation played
10 a role in that upgrade.

MS RAMAGAGA: Right. Shall we then proceed to paragraph 23 of your statement?

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Ma'am, ...

MS RAMAGAGA: Please. Oh sorry, thank you. I'm sorry
15 about that Chair. The paragraph 23, now your focus is on the post-1994 democratic elections, shall you inform the Commission about the continued phasing out of some weaponry and then the dawn of the, or rather then we shall proceed to deal with the acquisition of helicopters but please just close off
20 the acquisition relating to the fighter aircraft and the aircrafts.

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Thank you Mr Chair. We did mention the 1990 defence budget cut and we did mention the 1997 budget cut. Because of that amongst other factors it was no longer viable because the size of the Air Force was no longer
25 affordable, but certain platforms were already at or near the

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end of their useful life, so many platforms were phased out or beginning to be phased out, amongst them is the Mirage and the Impala also was close to the end of its life, I must say the Mirage F1, the variant that was phased out is the air-to-ground variant at first, not the air-to-air or the reconnaissance, this thing, they were also phased out but later on.

MS RAMAGAGA: Just before start dealing with the helicopters I notice from your statement that the South African Government has been involved in the acquisition of the licenses to, or the license to manufacture from as far back as the mid-1960's in that way back then there was a license acquired for the production of the Impala Mk2 and further on there was later a license acquired for a joint production of the Cheetah, which was actually an upgrade of the Mk.

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Of the Mirage III.

MS RAMAGAGA: Of the Mirage. Now that concept of buying a license to produce, was it also factored in, in respect of the acquisitions relating to the SDPP's?

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Mr Chair, I would explain that this way, that if you recall or if you read it is recorded that in 1960 the United Nations declared apartheid a crime against humanity which according to the UN Charter, that's one of the most serious crimes like genocide and things like those, so many, many countries started being apprehensive in doing business with South Africa, but moving forward, coming from the 1960's

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up to the mid-1970's, maybe late 1970's many, many other countries decided not to do business with South Africa, so the sanctions also picked up speed around that time.

5 So, the stance of the South African Government was try and much as is possible to be self-sufficient, to rely on domestic capability in terms of manufacturing as much as is possible, so the local industry was developed, many, many people were trained in specialised skills in the aviation industry, but also in the munitions industry in general, so
10 where possible where they managed to have partners out there that opportunity was taken and countries such as France was really open to this, probably others were doing it under the table but you know France was open, Israel was a close ally of this country at that time.

15 So, actually a formidable local industry was developed and had it been, it wasn't interrupted one way or another I believe it would compete with many around the world. With that obviously going forward the country would like to only retain but improve on those scarce highly specialised skills, so
20 in my mind even though I didn't participate in this personally Ma'am, in my mind I think that was a huge, huge consideration Mr Chair to say going forward whatever we acquire must have a local content because it is strategic to have, the country have those scarce and specialised skills in aircraft or in the aviation
25 industry or in munitions generally.

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MS RAMAGAGA: Shall we then proceed to paragraph 24 which is on page 5 of bundle G Mr Chair. This is the introduction of the subject relating to helicopters, the dawn of the helicopters within the South African Defence Force, shall
5 you please take us through?

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Thank you Mr Chair. With regard to helicopters I can say that the helicopter was introduced into battle in the latter stages of the 2nd World War, but the development thereof and the research around that started
10 much, much earlier, in fact just about at the end of the 1st World War, or around the 1st World War, but the science involved with helicopters is a bit tricky because here you don't have a fixed wing which you propel to generate lift, here you have rotors or rotor blades that need to generate that lift, so
15 the forces acting are similar but slightly different, here you are dealing with centripetal force, centrifugal force and things like those.

It took a long while, I think, to get the helicopter up to an operational stage, so it was introduced in the latter
20 stages of the 2nd World War. At that time, and even after the end of the 2nd World War it hadn't become evident or clear enough as to how this new invention could be used in battle. And then in the 1950's the Korean War happened, so between the end of the 2nd World War and the advent of the Korean War
25 people like Sikorsky who was a pioneer in the development of,

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or one of the pioneers in the development of helicopters kept working on improving this thing, so they took the opportunity in the Korean War to see how it can be used and the South African Air Force was participating in the Korean War as part of the United Nations.

Our crews that were there saw how helicopters are being used, largely for medical evacuation, for observation or resupplying of troops and things like those, and it began to dawn on many people that this invention can and is useful in battle.

In the late 1950's then South Africa acquired three helicopters, these were the Sikorsky S51, in fact four of them, one Sikorsky S51 and three Sikorsky S55. One can say these were more or less the first generation of helicopters that had some utility, practical utility. South Africa used these four helicopters mainly for the eradication of Tsetse flies on the northern parts of South Africa along the Limpopo River and places like that, but with the advent of turbine engines a new age dawned for helicopters and South Africa acquired the Alouette I helicopter from France, which had a turbine engine.

These were primarily used for training helicopter pilots, and then in 1962 South Africa acquire Alouette III's which were light utility helicopters, in today's terms you can say they are in the class of the A109 which those models are up there.

MS RAMAGAGA: Shall you then please take us through the

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acquisition of the different grades of Alouette's and the rest of the helicopters, because we have the Alouette II, the Alouette III and if you, as you take us through please also explain the use of those helicopters.

5 MAJ GEN MALINGA: Thank you Mr Chair, I would start by making a correction. Yes Ma'am you are correct, the first acquisition was the Alouette II with the turbine engine, that was used for training, to train the graduates from Central Flying School who were flying the Harvard, got their wings and
10 have been streamed for the helicopter line. They were then introduced to helicopters with this Alouette II. The Alouette II's were acquired in 1961. In 1962 Alouette III's were acquired. As I said this was the standard or main light utility helicopter used by the South African Air Force.

15 MS RAMAGAGA: May I just enquire, with regard to the use of the helicopters did the South African Defence Force maintain the three-tier system?

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Mr Chair, that would be correct because all pilots, their *ab initio* training was done with the Harvard's at
20 the Central Flying School. Now with the Alouette II and Alouette III in place it meant those that were streamed for the helicopter line will qualify on the Harvard in terms of basic flying and then have to be trained on the Alouette II before they go to operational helicopters, so yes, it was a three-tier
25 system also.

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MS RAMAGAGA: Now can you explain that three-tier system, assimilating it to the equipment that was acquired through the SDPP's within the helicopter environment?

5 MAJ GEN MALINGA: Thank you Mr Chair. In as far as the SDPP's are concerned in this case we are referring to the Alouette or rather the Agusta A109, so it's still the same case Mr Chair, all basic flying training or *ab initio* training happens at Central Flying School using the Pilatus PC7 Mk2. When youngsters qualify there and they are streamed to the
10 helicopter line they then are trained on the A109, when they qualify their operational conversion course, flight commander and things like those, then they move on to the Oryx. On Wednesday my colleague General Burger showed the, what he called progression of, that's exactly that picture, it's a three-
15 tier system.

MS RAMAGAGA: Right, thank you General. Then you can proceed to inform the Commission about the various other types of the helicopters that were procured over the period.

20 MAJ GEN MALINGA: Okay Ma'am. Mr Chair, the Alouette III or the Alouette III yes, had been acquired for largely to do scouting and liaison work, scouting, observation, you know patrolling and things like those. And then further batches of this type were bought between 1967 and 1975 by which time this Air Force, the South African Air Force had gained enough
25 operational experience on helicopters, particularly the

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Alouette's and at some point in time they worked with the Rhodesian Defence Force in counterinsurgency operations or counterterrorist, depending on which you know term you use, but unconventional warfare, and they were used for reconnaissance, for command and control and trooping.

Around this time also South Africa acquired what was called a Wasp helicopter and it was mentioned earlier by my colleagues, particularly from the Navy the Wasp helicopter was a dedicated maritime helicopter, it was largely used for anti-submarine warfare, it carried torpedoes. And then also another acquisition was the Super Frelon heavy lift aircraft, the Frelon's were then delivered from 1967 to 1969, the same year 1969 the South African Air Force ordered its first Puma medium transport helicopters.

Immediately after that, well not immediately, a few years after that the Alouette II was phased out in 1974 and the Alouette III then assumed or became the primary helicopter trainer because now we had the Puma's in place. As the conflict, or what was then referred to as the Bush War escalated it became obvious that for particularly the Puma in terms of deploying it swiftly, redeploy, supply troops over difficult terrain and in the absence of roads something needed to be done with this to improve its performance and utility.

Analysis or analyses were done, then the South African Air Force chose the Puma and the Puma generally

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proved to be useful in those roles that I mentioned, but also because of analyses being done it was found out that this Puma can be improved, the local industry Denel or Atlas Corporation, obviously with collaboration from other people a study began to see how they can improve this Puma aircraft. But in the meantime the Alouette III, the Puma and the Super Frelon were used in various operational areas, in the Bush War and in things like those.

Denel and the South African Air Force and whoever else was involved in the development of the better performing Puma in a hot and high environment and things like those really accelerated their work and this resulted in the locally developed Oryx medium transport helicopter where engines main and tail rotor blades, main, intermediate and tail gearboxes amongst others were industrialised and could be used by the developing Rooivalk combat support helicopter and upgrade of the Super Frelon. The Oryx flew first in 1987 but in 1989 the Frelon, the Super Frelon was phased out and in 1992 the replacement for the Alouette III which was the LUH, the replacement project thereof began, this is 1992.

MS RAMAGAGA: Right, just before you proceed Mr Chairperson, I see it is now 11h20, I'd like to enquire from the Chair as to what is the time earmarked for the adjournment?

CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps let's adjourn for 15 minutes. Thank you.

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MS RAMAGAGA: Thank you.

(Commission adjourns)

(Commission resumes)

MS RAMAGAGA: Chair, the witness is available to proceed
5 with the evidence, may we proceed please? May we proceed
with the witness?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, yes, you can.

MS RAMAGAGA: Thank you Chair. General when we
adjourned you were still busy informing the Commission about
10 the helicopters and the evolution relating to the helicopter use
within the South African Air Force, you may proceed.

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Thank you Mr Chair. We were at the
point of adjournment, we were at, where the Oryx was
developed and where the project to replace the Alouette had
15 started or was starting.

MS RAMAGAGA: May I just come in here so that the
chairperson and Commissioner Musi are with us. We are now
dealing with paragraph 30 of the statement onwards, that is
where General Malinga is Sir. Thank you.

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Thank you Mr Chair, we will start now
20 from paragraph 31 of my statement, there it's another
indication or another reference to the fact that in 1990 there
was a major budget cut and the helicopter fraternity within the
South African Air Force realised after this that it had to review
25 all its helicopter fleet and how it is composed. As I mentioned

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earlier the medium transport helicopter fleet was already being upgraded from Puma to Oryx and that the future of the Alouette III needed to be reviewed. At this point in time it was becoming more and more difficult to operate the Alouette III because the helicopter was also limited in terms of operational use, it was a single engine helicopter, obviously and also having its limitations in terms of night or poor visibility conditions.

Indications at that point were that Eurocopter, which is a helicopter manufacturer in Europe, France, were also going to discontinue the spares production line for the Alouette III. So, this then means even if consideration was given to extend the life of the Alouette III this Defence Force would run out of spares to operate them.

MS RAMAGAGA: Right, thank you General. You have mentioned in your evidence that the helicopters would amongst others be used as a transport utility, can you please expand on that use of the helicopter, transport use?

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Thank you Mr Chair. I did refer briefly to issues such as trooping when I said that the South African Air Force was gaining more and more experience in the use of helicopters and that at some point they operated jointly with the Rhodesian Armed Forces in counterinsurgency operations, they did scouting but they also did trooping. Now typically a transport operation for a helicopter would be to

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carry certain number of troops from one point to another, usually interfered, meaning at the area of operations or from a point close to the area of operations.

Now a helicopter like the medium transport
5 helicopter, for instance the Puma or in this case now is the Oryx, will carry a certain number of troops, it's got 16 seats onboard, it would carry 16 troops with their kit from one point to another but they also do cargo transportation depending on the size because there's a limitation also. Either search and
10 rescue where you rescue people and you put them on a stretcher you know, or supplies to ships, if a ship is at sea, not too far from the shore though you can take, maybe there's a relief of a doctor onboard or there's some equipment required by the ship because of either the equipment onboard has failed
15 or whatever, also depending on size the medium transport helicopter will transport those things. Special Forces also, Special Forces operate in small numbers, so it can also at night undetected insert them into a particular place, those are the transportation duties that I'm referring to.

20 MS RAMAGAGA: Right, thank you General. Now post the 1994 democratic elections the White Paper was produced which would inform the policy on Defence. Now would you like to comment about that before we proceed to paragraph 6, paragraph 36, I beg your pardon Chair, paragraph 36 which
25 deals with the phasing out, further phasing out of the

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armament, the Air Force armament.

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Thank you Mr Chair. My colleagues previously did refer to the White Paper and the Defence Review, I think what's important for me to say here is that the
5 development of these two document followed a consultative process, all stakeholders of this country participated, the general public, Government in terms of the executive and Parliament and all of that, so these policy documents are a reflection of the people of South Africa expressing their wish
10 and will as to how this country ought to be defended, but more importantly for me that collective wisdom Sir, for this country to be stable, for this country to not be thinking about other things it needs a defence force to maintain or to put in place a level of deterrence, so that any potential enemy or any
15 potential aggressor should think twice about doing that.

By this time though further defence budget cuts were introduced to the Defence Force and the South African Air Force in particular Ma'am had to then reduce the size of its fleet and this is where the Mirage F1az, the variant that I
20 referred to earlier on, the air-to-ground attack variant was phased out and more Impala's were phased out also. I did mention also that at this point the Impala's were ageing very fast or they were nearing the end of their life cycle very, very fast, so they were becoming obsolete. Yes Ma'am?

25 MS RAMAGAGA: General you have stated that the Cheetahs

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were actually delivered to South Africa even during the early 1990's and you also now mentioned that the fleet of the South African Air Force was drastically reduced. Regard being had to the fact that in terms of projections the Cheetah was estimated to have a life up until 2012 is there any reason as to why the Cheetahs were also phased out?

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Mr Chair, earlier on I did refer to the fact that the Cheetah was not a brand new aircraft, the Cheetah was a product of an upgrade programme, the upgrade of the Mirage III. With that in mind one can say look at the life cycle of the Mirage III, then you will come to a realisation that in any case the life cycle was going to end within a few years. Mr Chair, to answer the question directly yes, the life cycle of the Cheetah was projected to 2012 and we are at 1998, that's roughly 14 years, but where I'm getting at is if you are going to replace equipment such as aircraft it takes a long while, the process takes several years.

If you look at the process from putting in statements of a required operational capability to the point of delivery average time could be 10 years. So you do not allow for a gap, you start planning before what is in place right now before it comes to the end of its life. So, the consideration for the SDPP's and particularly the replacement for the Cheetah was at the right point in time because you had 14 years to work out exactly what you need looking at the resources available to

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you, looking at possible future usage, therefore influencing the design or the configuration of whatever platform that you will come to choose. And the process of also choosing is involved, it takes time, so I think that's the way I can answer that question.

5 MS RAMAGAGA: Thank you General. Shall we then proceed to briefly touch on the Defence Review with specific reference to the development of the force design. The witnesses that testified before you, in particular Admiral Brink has dealt
10 comprehensively with the subject but now I would like to focus your attention to the force design especially in relation to the Air Force. Can we hear your comments please, whether you can take us through or you would just like to make comments bearing in mind that Admiral Green and Admiral Higgs have
15 addressed the subject sufficiently.

JUDGE MUSI: Before you go there can I just get clarity just for my own self, when was this Cheetah introduced and when was it decommissioned?

20 MAJ GEN MALINGA: Thank you. Mr Commissioner, the Cheetah aircraft was introduced to the South African Air Force between 1986 and 1994, the last delivery was in 1994. The ...

CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry, 1994?

25 MAJ GEN MALINGA: The first delivery was 1986, the last delivery 1994. That also indicates how long it takes when you acquire equipment such as aircraft or ships, it's, the factory

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has to be configured particularly for that amongst other things and they produced one aircraft at a time, if you know other big manufacturers might produce two, three at a time but it takes a while to build aircraft to a specific configuration or to the specs that a customer has put in place Mr Commissioner.

JUDGE MUSI: The second leg of my question was when was it decommissioned, the Cheetah?

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Sir, that will be 2008 or just before 2008, but somewhere there, late 2007, early 2008.

JUDGE MUSI: Thank you, you may proceed.

MS RAMAGAGA: Thank you Commissioner Musi. Now shall we then revert to the Defence Review, especially with regard to the force design General Malinga?

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Thank you Mr Chair. Maybe as you correctly put it, my colleagues have elaborated on this, but maybe to just refresh. The main aim of the Defence Review of 1998 was to elaborate on the policy framework contained in the White Paper and particularly on long term planning on issues such as structure, force design, force levels and what armaments will fit those. That was the main aim behind the Defence Review. The guidelines given then out of the Defence Review will amongst other things include specifics such as the task that the SANDF will or may have to perform in the future, the manner in which these tasks should be undertaken, the equipment and weaponry required by the SANDF to fulfill those

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tasks and reference also to the policy framework contained in the White Paper on Defence and more importantly an analysis of the internal and external security environment. Now Ma'am on Wednesday you asked me about my duties that were
5 involved as Chief Director Ops Development, particularly on capability development and I mentioned a long term plan and all of that. Some of this is what we use then to define a desired end-state and work back.

MS RAMAGAGA: Right, thank you General. Shall we then
10 proceed to deal with the Defence Strategic Objectives.

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Mr Chair, the statutory requirement for the Defence Force to defend and protect South Africa, its people and to support broader government initiative translates into the Defence Strategic Objectives in this manner. First
15 obviously is to defend and protect the Republic, its sovereignty, its territorial integrity, its national interest and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force, but also to contribute to freedom from fear and want including the
20 promotion of human security both nationally and internationally, to contribute to a better life for the people of South Africa. Those are the main Defence Strategic Objectives. Now you can break these, some of them into probably clearer terms and definitions for common
25 understanding but in and of themselves they are

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straightforward.

MS RAMAGAGA: Right, shall we then proceed to deal with the force design.

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Ma'am, the guidelines given by
5 Government and the Defence Review at that time were based on one main principle, that Defence Planning could be described as needs driven and cost constrained, that term or that phrase
10 "needs driven and cost constrained" suggests that only the right level of defence capability is required right, stemming from other considerations. As I mentioned earlier also this
15 Defence Force was transformed from a war machine to a peacetime defence force and because there was no direct military threat that could be detected and that could be foreseen therefore this should be the level of defence.

15 On the other side what the country was saying it will be cost constrained because now this country no longer afford to spend 4.7% of GDP on defence, we don't have enemies, we're shifting our focus to socioeconomic issues human development and other related issues, so that was the
20 principle guiding the force design that Defence Force or Department of Defence, as you move ahead this is how you are going to do things.

MS RAMAGAGA: Now in order for the Defence Force to
25 carry out its mandate and in order to be able to comply with the desired force design from the strategic perspective, the

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different arms of service would then have to contribute and inform the department or rather the South African National Defence Force about the specific required capabilities, is that correct?

5 MAJ GEN MALINGA: Mr Chair yes, that's correct. What I just mentioned earlier to say the DOD was told this is how you are going to do business from now on based on that principle of needs driven cost constraint, the Department of Defence was then obliged to work out options based on that, so several
10 options were developed by the Department of Defence with the input from the SANDF wherein each service then looked at what might be the best force design.

MS RAMAGAGA: Now shall you inform the Commission as to what was recommended by the South African Air Force in
15 relation to the desired options, that appears in paragraph 46 of your statement which appears on pages 9 to 10 of bundle G Mr Chair.

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Thank you Ma'am. I just said that the Defence Review gave us guidelines and the whole DOD then sat
20 and came up with options, particularly there were four options that were sent out and one was chosen, in as far as the Air Force was concerned Ma'am you will see the table on page 10 of my statement , this is what was part of the option that was chosen by Government, the Air Force's portion of that.

25 MS RAMAGAGA: I just need clarity here General, is this list

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a wish list that came from the Air Force arm of service or is it the ultimate list that was approved by Parliament?

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Mr Chair this list is part of the option that was chosen out of four options or the option that was decided upon by Government out of four options, there were four options given to Government to say we can either go A, B, C or D and Government chose a particular option which then included this list. This list is a product of a very, very involved process where a lot of things are looked at you know, what's available out there, what is happening around technology, what will best suit a balanced defence force.

MS RAMAGAGA: Right General, shall we now deal with the questions relating to the absence of military threats as to why it is necessary for the South African Air Force to maintain a good fighting quality because there are arguments that there is no imminent threat of military force and why is it that the Air Force should continue to be well-equipped, can you just explain?

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Thank you. Mr Chair yes, since 1994 probably up to date we do not detect any direct military threat to the Republic of South Africa. We haven't detected anybody or any country that intends to invade or attack South Africa for whatever reason. Having said that Ma'am, Mr Chair, it doesn't mean that the country is free from other threats. I want to start by saying a defence force is a country's insurance policy

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if you look at it that way Mr Chair. Many of us sitting here are a hundred percent healthy, no pain, no any condition but we do take out insurance and pay premiums, many of us is now matured and things like those. Why, when you are perfectly healthy? Why do you do that? The same kind of thinking should be given where a country is concerned.

Yes, there are people who say there's no need for a defence force because we are at peace and they mentioned other countries that do not have defence forces, Ma'am where I'm sitting we all have opinions, we have freedom of speech and all of those things but I think people should also look at things from another angle. It was mentioned here by my colleagues there are about 21 countries or so that don't have defence forces in the world but I think may critics do not mention the fact that those countries are either in defence pacts with other countries or their defence is assured by another country, based on whatever arrangement, whether it's a bilateral arrangement or a multilateral arrangement. Other than that everybody on this planet, every country has a defence force and specifically for the reason that I mentioned earlier, it's a country's insurance policy.

When the 1st World War ended and the League of Nations was founded many, many analysts and intellectuals and even military people were said that the "great war" as they referred to the 1st World War, should be and surely could be

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the last war that human beings will be involved in because it was so brutal with so many casualties and unnecessarily so, but hardly 30 years after another major war broke out and in between a country like Spain exploded into a civil war, a civil war that drew in other countries, Germany was drawn in and tested its new equipment there, in fact Germany gained confidence of some of their capabilities by being involved in the Spanish Civil War.

And then the 2nd World War broke out, the much wider, probably even with more casualties than the 1st World War because towards the end we saw the world's first really, really devastating weapon, the atomic bomb, two were dropped, one in Nagasaki, the other in Hiroshima. Again when the 2nd World War ended many people thought mankind will come to their senses and won't repeat this, but I want to tell this Commissioner Mr Chair after the 2nd World War there have been many, many wars ever in the history of mankind. Today as we sit here there's wars around the world, so that part for me, I'm saying a defence force is a country's insurance policy.

To then go to the other part of your question Mr Chair, there are many threats other than those that are military, this country has to on a daily basis attend to issues or activities that could affect our way of life and things like those. As an example one of the main threats facing this country is organised crime, organised crime that permeates into a lot of

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things, drug smuggling, human trafficking, poaching you know, and other activities. We, as a defence force in conjunction with the police, for instance in the border safeguarding activities, we deal with organised crime on a daily basis. If we
5 do not then I don't know how many ... Do you know the situation in Mexico for instance where Mexicans on a daily basis live in fear because these drug cartels are actually making Mexico a dying state.

10 So, there are threats that need the country to react to and I believe the Defence Force is one of those state organs because of their organisation and how they are structured and their capabilities can actually respond to these threats effectively and decisively.

MS RAMAGAGA: General, as you were dealing with the
15 subject of lack or absence of immediate military threats you have mentioned that there is no country that lies bare and operate without security of a defence force, whether directly or indirectly. You have mentioned that some of the countries have concluded pacts with others as a way of seeking for
20 protection from those countries. Now given the history of the South African Defence Force, given the resources that South Africa has as well as the size of South Africa and of most importance is the armament history of South Africa, would you say that it would benefit the country's people in some way or
25 the other if the Government were to opt for the military pacts

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with one or another country and would that be in execution of its constitutional mandate if it were to opt for that and disband the military or disband the South African National Defence Force?

5 MAJ GEN MALINGA: Mr Chair, I will start by saying that would be very, very unfortunate if this country decides to scrap the Defence Force, it will be very unfortunate for many reasons, because what doesn't come to the fore are the other roles that a Defence Force plays in a country's economy in ensuring that
10 technology and such things are maintained and sustained or like I said on Wednesday those capabilities that are lying in the Defence Force that you won't find elsewhere to respond to disasters, emergencies and such things, it means then we need to spend money again, we squashed the Defence Force or we
15 remove it, we spent money again to set up these capabilities elsewhere.

But also I just painted a scenario of wars, nobody can predict the future, so the founders of the League of Nations after the 1st World War were thinking we are all now
20 shocked to a point where we have come to our senses, no more wars. People realised that Germany as a country, it's national psyche was affected, the German pride was affected by the 1st World War but they never thought that the Germans will build up to a point where they want to restore their pride and their
25 psychological wellbeing by being dominant again, no one could

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predict that and the 2nd World War happened with all its violence and whatever else, so we cannot say now because we are a peaceful country that nothing can happen.

5 Last week Spain and Britain were concluding a joint exercise on the Strait of Gibraltar but at the same time Spain was upping or was escalating the dispute on Gibraltar. Luckily both countries probably you know wouldn't take rash actions, but had it been there are other factors that will now spark a serious conflict there is a possibility that war would have
10 erupted between Spain and Britain, traditionally allies, friends, there was a border dispute between Botswana and Namibia, a small island on the north west of Botswana or just about yes, north west, west-north-west, both countries claiming this thing, the propriety on that island, it was settled at the international
15 court, but a thing like that could bring about war.

South Africa is one of the driest countries in the world, a factor that we don't realise most of us, if the Katse Dam in Lesotho or any of the rivers, because most of our rivers do not originate in our country, I think there's one river that
20 originates in South Africa, if those can be affected one way or the other and there are other issues involved we could go into war. Anything in human life involving the wellbeing and survival of people can trigger war, so it would be very, very unfortunate Mr Chair if the Defence Force is scrapped in this
25 country.

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MS RAMAGAGA: Just one last point on this item. In your response to the questions that I've asked you, you've spoken about wars being planned and now would you say it is rational not to plan for the armament capabilities and the rollout of those capabilities, would it be rationale for South Africa in particular, a constitutional country not to plan for that?

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Mr Chair, I think the leadership of the country would be shirking their responsibility and Ma'am, going back to the scrapping of the Defence Force or the cancellation of these SDPP's for instance, they are going to create a vacuum because even if we scrap and go back to tender or whatever, at most the fastest we can replace these more or less will be seven or eight years from now or from the date of scrapping the contracts, but to your question directly, to your question directly I think that would be shirking responsibility if you don't plan accordingly.

MS RAMAGAGA: Thank you General. Mr Chair and Commissioner Musi, we are now proceeding to page 11 of the witness's statement, we're now turning to deal with another subject and that is the rationale for the SDPP's commencing with paragraph 48. Thank you. General, will you please take us through the rationale for the SDPP's as indicated in your statement and do highlight areas that need to be highlighted. I will from time to time also come in and ask you for some explanations. Thank you.

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MAJ GEN MALINGA: Thank you. Mr Chair, we did mention the our options that were developed and an option that was selected by Government. At that time when the option was decided upon other processes then kicked in and amongst them
5 was the selection now of who will be the supplier of what's contained in that option. And many countries then started engaging South Africa positioning themselves and their products as being the best suited and things like those.

A key thing happened around this time Mr Chair,
10 1997, the budget cut of 1997, that then made or compelled the DOD to relook at its option, take another look at its option and it was found that as it is it might not be affordable, so whilst the selection process and all of these things were happening there was a revisit of the option. Amongst other things that
15 were reconsidered was the Army's main battle tank, it was deferred for later and then the, particularly the South African Air Force's option, the acquisition of the advanced light fighter aircraft and the future medium fighter aircraft was relooked because it would no longer be affordable.

20 And then a proposal was made that we'll go the route of the advanced light fighter aircraft and a lead-in fighter trainer. In this whole time as these countries were (indistinct) a new concept came in, the concept of packages. Before then it was just equipment being acquired or procured, we need 57
25 aircraft and you buy, you need so many tanks and you buy, this

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time the concept of a package, meaning not just the equipment on its own or you know with other things around it.

MS RAMAGAGA: Yes, you do mention, thanks General, you do mention in paragraph 51 of your statement that the South African Defence Force, the South African Air Force then was still operating or the arms of service were operating in terms of just looking at what their needs are at the time and you would look at what you require for the time as you are phasing out the others. Now that happened prior to the advent of the concept of the, or the adoption of the concept of the packages, procurement of a package rather than the piecemeal.

Now you have already indicated that there is a time when the South African Air Force had indicated as to what capabilities need to be refurbished or improved on and then there was the budget cut and thereafter or by then I think there was a parallel process relating to the Defence Review. Now the Defence Review came in, then the packages became conceptualised and it then became a policy of the Government to go the package way. Can you tell us as to whether there are any benefits that would have been derived from the change of strategy from having the line arms of service procuring or procuring through the requirements of the line service of the arms of service and changing to doing a full analysis and coming up with a package that should be purchased?

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Thank you Mr Chair. I can only say this,

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in hindsight that was the best decision ever taken, particularly in terms of where cost is concerned, that approach saved this country a lot of money and in as far as the Air Force is concerned I think the two platforms that came with the SDPP or the three, but particularly the two that are in the fighter line, the Hawk and the Gripen were the best buy because had we gone differently you know I think we'd be spending far more than what we have spent already. That's what to me in hindsight it seems to be.

10 MS RAMAGAGA: There is information to the effect that South Africa was the launch customer for the Gripen, can you just enlighten us and inform the Commission about the benefits that would have been derived through being a launch customer?

15 MAJ GEN MALINGA: Mr Chair yes, I think South Africa was a launch customer meaning external to Sweden because I think the Swedish Air Force are the first customer of the Gripen. I think yes, because of that there are benefits that were accrued, one of them being better pricing, the other being that Sweden and South Africa bilaterally could carry on cooperating and even develop new ventures if you will, joint, and also other countries, those that now operate the Gripen, their view of South Africa and how they relate to South Africa has enhanced South Africa's status internationally.

20 MS RAMAGAGA: General, maybe let's spend just little time, not much, because I think General Bayne will also talk much

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about the capabilities of the Gripen, I will just engage you in relation to the development of the Gripen that was suitable for the South Africans, that is the Gripen that was developed in accordance with the South African requirements, would you say
5 that by virtue of the specification of your needs in relation to the Gripen that was, that should be made for South Africa you have actually contributed towards the development of technology in respect of the fighter aircrafts in the world?

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Mr Chair that is correct, absolutely
10 correct. General Bayne, when he was explaining supersonic and transonic and, he mentioned something called, or he described something that at sea level the speed of sound is this and then as you go up and things like those. Where I'm getting at is the elevation at which we operate in South Africa
15 would be termed high elevation, but also the climate as compared to many countries in Europe or North America would be regarded as a hot climate, so there's a concept called hot and high.

When pilots train, even when they do simulation and
20 all of that you have to understand how an aircraft performs in a hot and high environment, but having said that there are other features and equipment in the South African Gripen that came from South Africans in terms of either specifications or you know, to ask the original manufacturer to say would you
25 consider a, b, c, d where this is concerned, so yes, in short the

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choice of the Gripen for us and what we specified has also contributed to the technology thereof, and other manufacturers are also looking at these issues and things like this. Thanks.

MS RAMAGAGA: Now subsequent to South Africa procuring the Gripen's, do you know of any other countries, do you know in fact as to whether there are any other countries that have since acquired the Gripen's?

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Mr Chair, I just want to clarify the question. You are asking after South Africa ordered these did anybody order after that?

MS RAMAGAGA: Yes that is correct, and that question is informed by a statement that South Africa was the launch customer of the Gripen, Sweden of course being the manufacturer would have been the, it would have created for itself but the launch customer was South Africa. Now what I'm trying to ascertain is whether was it the beginning and the end of Gripen outside of Sweden or where there acquisitions (indistinct)?

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Thank you Mr Chair. Yes Mr Chair, other countries did get the Gripen for their own air forces after South Africa bought it. I know of for instance Thailand is one of those countries and there are countries that operate the aircraft on lease also, the Czech Republic, Hungary. Right now Brazil is considering the Gripen or let me say the Gripen is one of the shortlisted aircraft that Brazil is looking at. Maybe

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General Bayne when he gives his statement he'll elaborate more because he participates in what we call the User Group, so I'm not too sure how big that group is, but I know for sure that Thailand bought, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Thank
5 you.

MS RAMAGAGA: Right, thank you. You may proceed, is there still anything that you want to talk about on rationale?

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Thank you. Mr Chair, the rationale that I'm giving in my statement is at the Air Force's level and I gave
10 a history, short history on the South African Air Force trying to show that the combat capability of this Air Force was developed over decades and that at some point this was a formidable war machine, and then I showed or rather compared what was until the late 1980's to what is now, and what is now
15 to me is sufficient for this country to project the right level of deterrence, so when the Air Force looked at what is given as guideline in the Defence Review the considerations were of various things also that now we are a peaceful country, but we need something that will make people think twice before they
20 can be aggressive to South Africa.

So, the rationale at the Air Force's level is purely looking at the mandate given by the Constitution and the policy framework contained in the White Paper on Defence and the guidelines given by the Defence Review of 1998. Yes, there
25 are operational considerations where we specify if we have to

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cover this then we need a, b, c, d, but that is the lowest level, it is that part of operational consideration, it is done within this overall governing framework and policy framework, this is what I'm trying to show here.

5 MS RAMAGAGA: Thank you General, shall you then proceed to inform the Commission about the helicopters, the needs of the Air Force in relation to the helicopters, that is contained in page 12 of bundle G and the information relating to the helicopters is contained in paragraph 58 of the general
10 statement.

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Thank you. Mr Chair, that's a short paragraph. What I'm trying to say there is derived from the fact that probably people were saying now this package of LUH's and all of that was not necessary, earlier when we were
15 dealing with the history I was given I showed that a project had already started in 1992 on the replacement of the LUH, the LUH at that point in time was the Alouette III helicopter, so here I'm just trying to show that the replacement of the Alouette III didn't start up now that these packages were on the table.

20 MS RAMAGAGA: Right. General, the questions that are asked by people that are to some extent disgruntled or unhappy about the acquisition of armaments during the time of peace is why, why should the armaments be procured and you have stated in your evidence that even in times of peace there is a
25 need for the country to be armed and you made reference to

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peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement at various stages of your evidence. Will you please inform the Commission about peacemaking, as to what that involves, what it entails, how do you go about engaging the armed forces in peacemaking in some way or the other, whether directly or indirectly and then peacekeeping and then in peace enforcement.

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Thank you. Mr Chair, one of my colleagues earlier mentioned the concept called military diplomacy. I would like the Commission to keep that in mind in terms of military diplomacy but I would like to answer in this manner Mr Chair, South Africa has got obligations, international obligations, by mere fact of being a member state of the United Nations and the African Union we've got obligations. So, if conflict erupts anywhere around our region or elsewhere on this continent, it is expected of us if called upon to help out with that situation. So, the peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement issues come from the fact that we've got obligations, regional, continental and international.

Now peacemaking as a concept is that process of trying to influence the belligerency in a particular conflict to come to a point of ceasefire and try to plead or to influence them to come to the table to discuss their differences. That largely is a civilian or civilian authorities will do that, whether

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Department of International Relations and Cooperation with their counterparts in other countries or via the UN itself or the AU, depending on where the conflict is and how it is attended to, sometimes the UN delegates to a regional organisation such as the AU to say we think that conflict, you as a regional organisation can deal with it sufficiently, we will give support where necessary, or the UN can say that we need to deal with it as the UN.

In that process you do bring in the military, one; as a show of force to say to the belligerents please go to the table before you know things become something else, or actually engaging. You will be surprised that in many areas of the world people would rather listen to a soldier than anybody else for whatever reason. So, the peacemaking process is a multidisciplinary process, in fact all of them are a multidisciplinary issue but peacemaking involves dialogue, involves coercion, subtle coercion and things like those.

Peacekeeping, that's the traditional United Nations way of doing things or was where the intent is to go in between the belligerents and separate them and keep the peace. There are examples of long term deployments as what is called a (indistinct), United Nations international force in Lebanon is one of the longest deployments in the world, they are there, amongst other issues there's the issue of the Golan Heights between Syria and Israel, that's the traditional way of keeping

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peace, going between the belligerents and separate them.

Peace enforcement Ma'am, or let me put it this way, peacemaking, peace building and peacekeeping fall under Chapter 6 of the United Nations Charter, peace enforcement
5 falls under Chapter 7 and peace enforcement says if these belligerents do not listen, whoever is guilty the United Nations has a right to take military action against them. As way of an example they have declared that the East Congo, the M23 rebels didn't want to listen to whatever, not observing the
10 peacekeeping efforts and all of that, an intervention force should be there and it will be operating under Chapter 7. Chapter 7 actually is war declared by the United Nations.

In as far as the African Union is concerned it's got what is called the peace and security architecture, it also
15 follows the same structure, the same hierarchy in trying to resolve conflict but wherein crimes against humanity are concerned that architecture says the AU must intervene, so you call in troops to go in there without negotiating without pre-arrangement. Thank you.

20 MS RAMAGAGA: Thank you General. Mr Chairperson and Commissioner Musi, I notice that it is 13h00, I am not going to be very long with the witness, with your indulgence I would request that I continue to finalise the evidence of this witness.

CHAIRPERSON: You can go ahead Ms Ramagaga, thank you.

25 MS RAMAGAGA: Thank you Chair. General, if South Africa

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had not acquired the armament capabilities that it has acquired through the SDPP's would it be able to effectively and efficiently participate in the peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions?

5 MAJ GEN MALINGA: Mr Chair I'm not too sure, I can to a satisfactory point speak confidently about sufficiently or effectively because from what I've described many of our capabilities, particularly in the Air Force, but also listening to my colleagues from the Navy, you would realise that by the
10 mid-1990's or early 2000's most of our equipment would have been obsolete. Now whatever was left was also not too far from the end of its life cycle, so by way of answering you I don't think so but probably we would have made a plan somehow with those obsolete equipment but it would have been
15 far more expensive because the greater part of the expense when you operate equipment that is obsolete is that wherever you find spares the spares pool has diminished, so those that have the spares will charge you through the roof, and actually they can hold you or render you incapable because they can
20 make other demands, they are the only ones who have those spares.

MS RAMAGAGA: Would the South African Air Force be able to prevent war, that is deter, through deterrence without a credible fighter core?

25 MAJ GEN MALINGA: Mr Chair I did mention earlier on when I

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was asked if these are cancelled and the Defence Force is scrapped, that this country no longer has a defence force, I said that would be very unfortunate and I would like to repeat that it would be very, very unfortunate. But coming to your question directly I would like to say this, each country projects
5 itself to the rest of the world, international relations and dynamics in the global sphere are largely influenced by how a specific country projects itself.

We are saying now there's only one superpower
10 because since the collapse of the Cold War and the demise of the Warsaw Pact demise, the worst is the dominant, this thing, and in particular America is the only superpower left in the world. There are other powers but not superpowers. America projects its power and therefore influence not because they are
15 the biggest economy in the world but because we all understand that if anything else they will impose themselves. How do you impose yourself and your will on other nations?

They've just deployed two aircraft carriers
yesterday or day before yesterday to the Mediterranean Sea, no
20 they are only exercising but we all know that there is a possibility that they can strike Syria you know, so whoever is sitting in Syria is actually thinking twice now about several things. We are not at that level, we are at the level where we are saying we've got sufficient and proper capabilities to
25 ensure that if anybody invades us or attacks us or is an

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aggressor, must think twice. They could be stronger than us, they could have far more capabilities than us, meaning in a protracted war probably they will overcome us, but definitely they will come out with a blue eye themselves.

5 MS RAMAGAGA: If ever they come back with an eye at all. Right General, what I will now request you to tell the Commission or to inform the Commission about is what the, what consequences would flow from the cancellation of the contracts relating to the armament, the South African Air Force
10 armament that has been acquired through the SDPP's.

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Mr Chair, I did mention this earlier on that that would be very, very unfortunately but besides the fact that the security of this country will be compromised and in my opinion compromised severely, there are other sectors of this
15 economy that will be affected and in that we might also lose those scarce and specialised skills. Local industry is involved in these one way or the other, some parts are manufactured in South Africa.

Yes, people will lose jobs and they could be
20 poached by other people elsewhere in the world because they've got scarce skills and specialised skills, I think even if these are cancelled and then new tenders are sent out there will be a gap for a while, there will be a gap of about seven, eight years where we don't have this deterrence I was referring
25 to just now and I think South Africa's stature in the region will

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also be dented.

MS RAMAGAGA: Now you've made mention of the gaps that exist, can you inform the Commission about the gaps that exist and maybe also just address the Commission if there's anything
5 that you'd like to say about the acquisition as against the constitutional responsibilities, the position of South Africa presently and any other comment that you would like to make.

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Thank you Mr Chair. Yes, I did mention earlier that the budget cut of 1997 compelled the DOD to defer
10 other capabilities or to change other capabilities, but that which is listed on page 10 that we looked at on page 10 that we looked at earlier indicates a list of those required capabilities. These were not addressed completely by the SDPP's, for instance, and I'm going back to the statement by Admiral Higgs
15 on the shortfall or the gap of the maritime patrol aircraft, the long range maritime patrol aircraft that will amongst other things support the Navy.

Mr Chair each time I'm referring to these capabilities you must remember my statement when we were
20 looking at the tenants of airpower and also when I stated on Wednesday that one of the main roles of an air force is to support surface forces, whether by way of tactical fire support or by way of dropping supplies to an army unit that's somewhere or whatever, but one of the main roles of an air
25 force is to support the army and the navy.

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In terms of us carrying out our mandate in terms of the protection and defence of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of this country there are gaps at sea because we don't have a long range maritime patrol aircraft, but more importantly for me looking at the operations we are conducting right now, in the peace support operations we are conducting right now there's a huge gap in as far as strategic lift is concerned, sea lift, air lift, there are gaps. We have medium transport aircraft but we need what is termed strategic air lift and we also need strategic sea lift, strategic in the sense that you can project yourself over long distances with enough supplies or you can take a large number of troops or forces at one go and place them wherever you want to place them instead of this piecemeal, this thing. So, those are the major gaps that I can mention. There are others but I'm not at liberty to, or I would rather not mention them here.

MS RAMAGAGA: Now looking at the gaps that you have mentioned what would you suggest be done in order for the South African Air Force to maintain a good fighting quality?

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Mr Chair apologies, I would ask Mr Chair, I didn't understand the question in context, if I may, may I ask Ms Ramagaga to repeat the question?

CHAIRPERSON: Can I perhaps maybe put the question this way, what do you think is still required in order to be in a position to carry out your constitutional mandate properly or is

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there other equipment that you think that the Air Force still requires in order to be in a position to carry out its conditional mandate, you don't have to mention the type of equipment that you think you require, if you do require any. Ms Ramagaga, would I have articulated the point that you wanted to make?

MS RAMAGAGA: Yes Chair, it has been properly and eloquently articulated, thank you.

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Thank you very much Mr Chairman. Yes, I just mentioned now strategic lift and a long range maritime patrol aircraft, we definitely need that. In the area of air space management there are certain capabilities that we need to augment and I think in the area of the medium and light transport aircraft as an air force we feel that for us to be able to really carry out our mandate or our part of the mandate as the Defence Force those areas ought to be looked at. Thank you.

MS RAMAGAGA: Right. Thank you Commissioners, that concludes the evidence of General Malinga.

CHAIRPERSON: Is there any person who wants to cross-examine the General? Thank you.

DR MADIMA: Thank you Chairman, we have no questions in re-examination.

CHAIRPERSON: I'll come to you Dr Madima, we're still trying to see if there's any person who wants to cross-examine. Nobody wants to cross-examine. Then Dr Madima, any re-examination?

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DR MADIMA: We have no questions to cross-examine or to re-examine.

CHAIRPERSON: Excuse me?

5 DR MADIMA: I say that we have no intention to cross-examine or to re-examine.

CHAIRPERSON: I suppose General, thanks a lot to ...

JUDGE MUSI: Can I make a statement?

CHAIRPERSON: Okay.

10 JUDGE MUSI: I was quite interested to her about the factors that influenced the choice of the Gripen's because you hinted at some of them, but then I think I must withhold asking you about that because in your opening statement you made it clear on paragraph 5 that you were not directly involved in the process, so I think it would be unfair to want you to answer to
15 that type of question, am I right?

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Thank you Mr Chair. Mr Commissioner yes, but also it will even be more unfair because that didn't lie at the level of the Defence Force. The DOD gave options and higher authority then went through a process of choosing, so in
20 both ways the fact that I wasn't directly involved but also I'm sitting here at the level of the Defence Force, the Defence Force didn't do that, it gave options and recommendations, decisions and other things happened elsewhere.

JUDGE MUSI: Thank you.

25 CHAIRPERSON: Again thanks a lot General, you are excused

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from attending this proceedings.

MAJ GEN MALINGA: Thank you very much Mr Chair.

MS RAMAGAGA: Thank you Chair and Commissioner Musi.

The witnesses that will be called to present evidence on behalf
5 of the Air Force, further witnesses that will be called are
General Bayne, he will be called on Monday, and upon
completion of his evidence the next witness to be called will be
Colonel Viljoen and thereafter it will be General Burger. We
have already given you the summaries of the evidence that will
10 be presented by these three witnesses.

CHAIRPERSON: What we are trying to find out is whether the
summaries or the evidence that is going to be led by the
witnesses that you have mentioned, whether is that going to be
made available on our website or not.

15 MS RAMAGAGA: Yes Chair, I get an indication that it will
be on the, they will be on the website, or they are already on
the website. Remember Chair the information was given to the
Commission Secretariat last Friday, so that information, those
summaries have since been posted on the website.

20 CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. We will adjourn until,
and will resume on Monday morning at 09h30.

MS RAMAGAGA: Thank you Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. We'll adjourn.

25 **(COMMISSION ADJOURNS)**